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The elaborate system of administration of decedents' estates under
court control found in the United States' is a legacy from the English
common law and has been attributed to the sovereign's desire to
protect creditors and to secure the payment of fees and taxes.' With
primary concern for creditors, English administration resembled the
procedure used for the liquidation of a company or of a bankrupt's
affairs, i.e., all assets and liabilities of the estate were administered by
a representative before any benefit passed to the testate or intestate
successors.' Moreover, the executor or administrator was vested with
the title to personal property.4 On the other hand, continental Eu-
ropean systems reflected less concern for creditors and emphasized
the practice under the Roman law of the immediate transmission of
property to the decedent's successors Thus, the entire estate passed
to the intestate heir without formal administration, or similarly under
a will, to a universal successor who assumed the legal personality of
the testator burdened with all of testator's debts.'
A. Simplified Estate Transfers In Europe
In France, the heir simply assumes the personality of the decedent
and is entitled to immediate possession of the entire assets, subject
to the payment of all the decedent's debts. Under a will, an ap-
pointed heir assumes this personality without formal administration.
Thus, the heir presents himself to the holder of the decedent's asset
with a certificate that has been duly drawn by a French lawyer,
called a notary; thereupon the holder must deliver the asset to the
heir indicated in the certificate or otherwise deal with it as the heir
directs. Change of title to immovables is accomplished by the filing
of an attestation setting out the devolution of the property. If there
* Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas. A.B., University of Texas; LL.B., Yale University.
'See generally Basye, Streamlining Administration under the Texas Probate Code, 35
Texas L. Rev. 165 (1956); Simes & Basye, Organization of the Probate Court in America
(pts. 1-2), 42 Mich. L. Rev. 965, 974-78, 43 Mich. L. Rev. 113 (1944).
"Marschall, Independent Administration of Decedents' Estates, 33 Texas L. Rev. 95
(1954).
'Brown, Winding Up Decedents' Estates in French and English Law, 33 Tul. L. Rev.
631 (1959).
4 Rheinstein, European Methods for the Liquidation of Debts of Deceased Persons, 20
Iowa L. Rev. 431 (1935).
5 Brown, supra note 3, at 646.
Sitheinstein, supra note 4, at 432.
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are a number of heirs, a formal document called an acte de partage
is used. In the instances in which the decedent has accumulated a
large number of debts unknown to the heir who receives the assets,
the results may be catastrophic. Thus, even in France, there has de-
veloped a special proceeding available to the heir. An accounting,
called an acceptance with the benefit of an inventory, is compiled in
the presence of all interested parties. As a result, the heir's liability
is limited to the extent of the amount of assets inventoried. However,
the heir remains personally liable for all death duties.7
B. Simplified Administration In England
Supervision of the streamlined administration systems of conti-
nental Europe is generally entrusted to the lawyers representing the
heirs and creditors rather than to the courts.8 In actual practice,
modern estate administration in England is very much like the in-
dependent administration in Texas However, the English have ex-
tended this concept to ordinary administrations which would be
under court control in Texas. Subsequent to the grant of letters
testamentary or administration by an English court, the work of
getting in the estate, agreeing to the payment of taxes, and dis-
tributing the residue is done privately and entirely out of court; no
accounts of any kind have to be filed." The court is not at all con-
cerned with the matter when letters of administration are involved
as well as in cases of probate."
C. Developments In The United States
Despite the contrary development in England toward simplifica-
tion and expedition of administration, the trend in the United
States has been to retain and, in some instances, to refine some of the
more undesirable features of English common-law administration.
Generally, the state systems are characterized by detailed formality
and thorough judicial supervision. The successful operation of simpli-
fied out-of-court administration systems in continental Europe and
present-day England, as well as in Texas" and Washington, indicates
7 Brown, supra note 3, at 635-42.
1d. at 642.
' See Burrows, How A Decedent's Estate Is Administered In England, in A.B.A. Proceed-
ings, Section of Real Property, Probate & Trust Law 11-15 (1960); George, The Bread And
Butter Practice Of The Average Solicitor, in A.B.A. Proceedings, Section of Real Property,
Probate & Trust Law 37-44 (1957).10 Burrows, supra note 9, at 14; George, supra note 9, at 42.
" Burrows, supra note 9, at 14.
" Texas probate law in particular owes much to the law of Louisiana which in turn
was derived from the civil law and continental Europe. See generally Stayton, Texas'
Approaches to the Parker Ideal, 37 Texas L. Rev. 845 (1959),
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that many of the formalities required by the states are unnecessary.
The problems involved in many of the over-articulated, tedious, and
expensive systems developed in the United States have influenced
both laymen and attorneys to avoid administration altogether, to
utilize out-of-court techniques, or to shorten formal court adminis-
trations.,"
D. Purposes Of Administration, Heirship, And Creditors
The fundamental purposes of an administration are: (1) the col-
lection of the assets belonging to the decedent's estate, (2) the pay-
ment of debts and claims due from his estate, and (3) the distribu-
tion of the remaining property to the person or persons entitled to
it as promptly as practicable consistent with the foregoing.' In the
absence of a will designating specifically who is entitled to the dece-
dent's property, it is necessary to determine the heirs in accordance
with the state's statutes of descent and distribution. In a formal
court administration, the designation of these distributees is expressed
in a decree of distribution by the probate court." Alternative means
for determining such distributees usually require a court proceeding.
In Texas, for example, if there has been no administration, affidavits
of heirship are often used." By statute, such affidavits are prima facie
evidence in heirship proceedings when recorded for five years or more
in the county in which the property affected by the statement is
situated.' Under sections 48-56 of the Texas Probate Code, the
statutory heirship procedure is detailed and made applicable to both
real and personal property in nonadministration cases as well as those
cases in which property has been omitted from administration or
rights in such property have not been declared.
Most states provide for the tolling of the statute of limitations on
creditor claims until the appointment of a representative of the dece-
dent's estate. In Texas, the statutes of limitation are tolled for one
year unless and until the representative is sooner qualified. 8 In addi-
"Discussion of the important development of avoiding administration in many situa-
tions by contract, such as life insurance and profit-sharing plans with their designation of
beneficiaries other than the decedent's representatives or estate, joint tenancies, co-owner-
ship bonds, inter vivos trust agreements, and the like has been omitted. Suffice it to say
that by means of these arrangements, a tremendous amount of property in this country
has been put beyond the jurisdiction of probate and nonjudical administration. Accordingly,
this study is concerned only with those items of estate property which would come within
the juridsiction of a probate court if the estate were administered under court control.
"4 Such entitled persons, whether devicees or legatees under a will or the heirs and next
of kin in cases of intestacy will hereafter, as in the Texas Probate Code § 3(j), be sometimes
referred to as "the distributees."
l5Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 408(b) (1956).
1 See Basye, supra note 1, at 170 n.19.
1 Texas Prob. Code Ann. § 52 (1956). See 26 Texas B.J. 379-80 (1963).
"STex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5538 (1958).
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tion, non-claim statutes protect the personal representatives in making
distributions after one year of administration. However, these statutes
do not prevent creditors who failed to file their claims in time from
pursuing the estate assets in the hands of the distributees,1"' although
the more modern view would extinguish claims not filed during such
period, even though within the normal period of limitations."0
II. AVOIDING ADMINISTRATION
A. Informal Family Settlement In Texas
The informal family settlement is the method generally used in
this country to avoid administration. Such a settlement is satisfactory
if the distributees can gain possession or transfer of the decedent's
property. Under Texas law, it is clear that the devisees and heirs may
by mutual agreement partition the property among themselves sub-
ject to the rights of creditors, and thus dispense with the necessity of
probating the decedent's will. 1 Moreover, the distributees may by
agreement validly waive the provisions of the decedent's will and
permit the property to pass under the law of descent and distribu-
tion." It has been said that the law favors such "family settlements."
However, if there is any possible question about the identity of the
proper heirs or devisees, or their capacity to make a binding agree-
ment, such distributees may encounter the plea that the personal
representative is the only proper party to enforce payment or transfer
and give a binding release to one owing a debt to the decedent."
Such a plea has been sustained when the heirs brought suit within
the four-year period allowed for administration, but failed to plead
and prove that no administration was pending and that none was
necessary." This was so despite the fact that under Texas law both
real and personal property vest immediately upon the decedent's
death in his heirs or devisees, subject to the payment of his debts."
Texas courts have been more lenient, however, if the existence of
creditors was doubtful." A problem arises if the distributees cannot
gain possession or transfer of the property after their informal
agreement.
"
9Blinn v. McDonald, 92 Tex. 604, 46 S.W. 787 (1899).
20See Model Probate Code § 135, Comment (Simes 1946).
21Wade v. Wade, 140 Tex. 339, 167 S.W.2d 1008 (1943).
22 Cooke v. Hamer, 158 Tex. 164, 309 S.W.2d 54 (1958). See Note, 11 Baylor L.
Rev. 126 (1959).
"Kellner v. Blaschkce, 334 S.W.2d 315 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) error Yef. n.r.e.;
Stringfellow v. Early, 40 S.W. 871 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897).
1
4 Atkinson, Wills 567-68 (2d ed. 1953); Basye, supra note 1, at 171.
25Youngs v. Youngs, 26 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Comm. App. 1930).
26 Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 37 (1956).2
'Duncan v. Veal, 49 Tex. 603 (1878).
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B. Other Methods Of Avoiding Administration In Texas"
One of the leading writers in the United States on streamlining
administration has stated that "it may be said without reservation
that Texas has more methods than any other state to simplify or dis-
pense with the process of administration.""' Therefore, the discussion
which follows examines these methods, viz., of avoiding administra-
tion entirely, in limiting administration, in permitting out-of-court
administrations, and in shortening and closing formal court adminis-
trations already begun.
1. Order of No Necessity If there is no need for administration,
section 180 of the Probate Code should be used to obtain a probate
court order of no necessity. Such an order constitutes sufficient legal
authority to any person for payment or transfer to the decedent's
"distributees" of any property belonging to the estate." If the person
entitled to the decedent's asset is clearly designated in a will, the only
problem is satisfactory identification. Furthermore, the existence of
several distributees, if all are of age and join in the request for trans-
fer or payment with proper identification, does not complicate the
problem. If an intestacy is involved, an heirship proceeding 1 to
ascertain the distributees will probably be required by transfer agents
or other persons having custody of the property. In instances in
which the heirs purporting to be the distributees are well known to
the transfer agent or custodian, such distributees may be permitted
to obtain possession of the property without an heirship proceeding
upon giving a corporate surety bond, or in a few instances, upon
executing an indemnity agreement.
The compiler of the Texas Probate Code in his interpretative com-
mentary indicates that section 180 was drafted with out-of-state
attorneys and transfer agents in mind." However, a recent decision
held that if a Texas bank refuses to make distribution in accordance
with an order of the probate court entered under section 180 when
no adverse claim has been made to the bank for the property, the
bank has no right to invoke the doctrine of stakeholder, and thus it
is not entitled to attorney's fees or court costs in bringing an inter-
pleader suit."
2. Satisfaction of Creditor Seeking Administration If a creditor
"SThe extensive powers of an unqualified community survivor entirely outside probate
court control will be discussed subsequently. See text accompanying note 113 infra.
29 Basye, supra note 1, at 187.
'
0 Texas Prob. Code Ann. 5 180 (1956).1 Texas Prob. Code Ann. 55 48-56 (1956).
" See Commentary, 17A Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. 600 (1956).
23 Davis v. East Texas Say. & Loan Ass'n, __ Tex. -, 354 S.W.2d 926 (1962);
Orem v. Farmers Nat'l Bank, 325 S.W.2d 149 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) error ref. n.r.e.
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insists on administration to pay his claim, section 80 can be used by
an interested party to prevent administration by (a) paying the
claim, (b) proving to the satisfaction of the probate court that the
claim is illegal, fraudulent, fictitious, or barred by 'limitations, or
(c) filing a bond double the amount of the claim.34 In this connec-
tion, deed of trust holders should be cognizant that the Texas Supreme
Court has clearly stated that any sale made under a deed of trust
"after the death of the mortgagor and within four years thereof
will be canceled if an administration is opened and the administrator
seeks cancellation, and they will thus be encouraged to pursue their
remedy in an administration proceeding in the first instance. s The
court pointed out that "where there is a necessity therefor the
mortgagee can force the opening of an administration or the payment
of his claim and thus avoid the expense and trouble of a sale under
the deed of trust."'
3. Collection of Estates Under 1,000 Dollars by Affidavit If an estate
is under 1,000 dollars in value exclusive of the homestead and exempt
property and no application for administration has been granted or
is pending, section 137 can be used to collect the estate by filing an
affidavit with the county clerk. The payment, delivery, transfer, or
issuance to the distributees named therein has the same effect as if
made to the decedent's personal representative.
4. Summary Disposition of Estates to Pay Year's Family Allowance
A particularly valuable technique, although not extensively used,
is available in situations in which the value of the estate exclusive of
the homestead or allowance of 5,000 dollars in lieu thereof and
exempt property or allowance up to 1,000 dollars in lieu thereof" is
less than what the surviving spouse and the children are entitled to
as a family allowance. In such a situation, section 139 can be used
to obtain an order of no administration and of assignment of the
entire estate to the surviving spouse and children 9 immediately after
the approval of an inventory and appraisement. 0 Since there is no
limit upon the court's determination of the family allowance for
one year except reasonableness and lack of separate property owned
by the wife and minor children adequate for their maintenance,'
'
4 Tex. Prob. Code Ann. S 80 (1956).
"
5 Pearce v. Stokes, 155 Tex. 564, 291 S.W.2d 309 (1956).
"Id. at 310-311.
" Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 137 (1956). For a discussion of some of the problems raised
by this provision, see Basye, supra note 1, at 175-78.
"
8 Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 273 (1956).
'
5 Tex. Prob. Code Ann. §§ 139-43 (1956).4 0 Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 286 (1956).4
'Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 288 (1956).
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this section could be used very effectively in the situation in which
the value of the estate other than the homestead and other exempt
property is less than the decedent's annual income. Thus, it would
be possible that the surviving wife and minor children of a man
having an income of 15,000 dollars a year, a 40,000 dollar mortgage-
free home, 12,000 dollars in securities or cash, personal property ap-
praised at 5,000 dollars, and funeral and last illness expenses of
1,000 dollars could have the benefit of this section irrespective of a
large amount of debts. An order of no administration, an assignment
to the wife and children by the representative of such securities and
money promptly after the husband's death, the filing of an inventory,
and the payment of the preferred funeral and last sickness expenses"
could be obtained if the court would allow a reasonable family allow-
ance in the amount of decedent's annual income.43
5. Intestacy Situations Involving Community Property and No Sur-
viving Children If there are no surviving children of an intestate,
all community property passes to the surviving spouse charged with
community debts, and no administration is necessary." This is
similar to the continental European system of avoiding formal ad-
ministration except that the surviving spouse will not be liable for
any community property claims against the decedent in excess of
the amount of the community property involved.
6. Lapse of Time Of course, lapse of time may also constitute a
means of avoiding administration. Under section 74, a creditor's
right to administer decedent's estate is lost if an application for ad-
ministration is not filled within four years after the decedent's
death."
7. Probate of Will as Muniment of Title Texas is an unique juris-
diction in that before administration of any estate can be granted,
the necessity for administration must be shown to the satisfaction
of the court." A 1961 amendment to section 89 of the Probate Code
provides, in conformity with previous practice, that if the court is
satisfied that the estate owes no unpaid debts other than debts
secured by liens on real estate, or for other reasons that there is no
necessity for administration, it may admit such will to probate as
a muniment of title. The court's order shall constitute sufficient legal
"Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 290 (1956).
"Tex. Prob. Code Ann. §§ 287, 289, 291, 292. Pace v. Eoff, 48 S.W.2d 956 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1932).
"Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 155 (1956).
4Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 74 (1956).
'Tex. Prob. Code Ann. §§ 178(b), 88(d) (1956).
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authority for payment or transfer of the estate assets to the persons
entitled thereto under the will without administration..'
No person having a will in his possession should fail to file the will
unless, as previously mentioned, all the distributees agree not to pro-
bate same. Under section 75, such a person, upon the filing of a
sworn written complaint and citation, may be arrested and im-
prisoned by the probate judge until he delivers the will or other
papers belonging to the decedent's estate. Moreover, such a person
is, as a matter of law, liable to any person damaged as a result of
the refusal to deliver the will."'
III. TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATION
No discussion of abbreviated forms of court administration would
be complete without mention of temporary administration. A tem-
porary administration is available upon a finding by the probate
judge that the interest of a decedent's estate requires an immediate
appointment of a personal representative, which may be made with
or without written application and without notice or citation.49 Con-
trary to the permanent administration situation, the probate judge
has broad discretion in setting the amount of bond of a temporary
administrator.0 One point that may be overlooked, particularly in
relation to the subsequent liability of the temporary administrator,
is that the rights and powers of such administrator must be specifi-
cally expressed since any act not so expressly authorized is void.'
Thus, a detailed list of powers is desirable and necessary.
Under section 131(c), a temporary administration is not made
permanent unless found by the court to be necessary. Another dis-
advantage removed by the new Code is that with respect to tem-
porary administrations granted pending a will contest or a contest
on application for letters of administration, the probate court may
confer on such temporary administrator all the powers of a per-
manent administrator with respect to claims against the estate, in-
cluding power to sell real or personal property for the payment of
such claims." The temporary administrator is entitled to a discharge
upon delivery to the distributees in accordance with a court order
following the filing of a final account."
4 Tex. Prob. Code Ann. 5 89 (Supp. 1962).
4 Tex. Prob. Code Ann. S 75 (1956).
4 9 Tex. Prob. Code Ann. 55 131(a), (b) (1956).
'
0
Tex. Prob. Code Ann. 55 131(b), 194(13) (1956).
"Tex. Prob. Code Ann. 5 133(a) (1956).
'
2
Tex. Prob. Code Ann. 5 132(b) (1956).
"Tex. Prob. Code Ann. 5 135 (1956).
1963 ]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
IV. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF PARTICULAR
OUT-OF-COURT ADMINISTRATIONS
A. Independent Executors
A method of out-of-court administration commonly used in Texas
is the independent executorship which is invoked by certain special
words in the will or their equivalent."
1. Scope of Independent Executor's Authority In Texas, an inde-
pendent executor can do every act in relation to the settlement of
the estate that an ordinary executor under court supervision may be
authorized to do only by court order.'5 "Settlement of estate" has
been defined in a leading case" as including the adjustment and pay-
ment of debts against the estate, the sale of decedent's property for
payment of his debts, the setting aside of exempt property to the
widow and minor children, and the distribution of the estate to the
distributees entitled thereto.
2. Areas in Which Probate Court's Jurisdiction Can Be Reasserted
Significantly, it has been held that the resignation provisions apply
to an independent executor; thus, the probate court may receive his
resignation. However, court action is necessary for the resignation
to be effective." Other areas in which the jurisdiction of the probate
court has been invoked include:
1. Requiring the executor to post bond when he is mismanaging
the estate or has otherwise become disqualified, subject to removal
for failure to do so.'"
2. Upon application by a creditor, requiring all persons entitled
to any portion of the estate to file a bond, subject to administration
under court order for failure to do so."
14Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 145 (1956), states: "Any person capable of making a will
may provide in his will that no other action shall be had in the county court in relation
to the settlement of his estate than the probating and recording of his will, and the
return of an inventory, appraisement, and list of claims of his estate .. " The independent
executorship is also known to the jurisdictions of Washington, Arizona, Idaho, and Puerto
Rico. However, Washington is the only jurisdiction, other than Texas, which extensively
utilizes this form of administration. Marschall, supra note 2, at 91. For a history of the
Texas independent administration, see Marschall, supra note 2, at 97-99. In Washington,
an independent executorship is called an "administration under a non-intervention will."
Contrary to the Texas practice, the latter administration must apparently remain under
court direction until the estate is declared solvent. Comment, 34 Wash. L. Rev. 263, 266
(1959). Attempts by testators in other jurisdictions to deprive courts of jurisdiction over
the settlement of their estates have been declared violative of public policy. Marschall,
supra note 2, at 96 n.l1.
5 Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 145 (1956).
"eRoy v. Whitaker, 92 Tex. 357, 49 S.W. 367 (1899), modifying 92 Tex. 346, 48
S.W. 892 (1898).
7 See Ewing v. Foley, 239 S.W. 251 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922), rev'd on other grounds.
"Tex. Prob. Code Ann. 5 149 (1956).
"
9 Tex. Prob. Code Ann. 5 148 (1956).
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3. Partition and distribution of the estate upon the executor's ap-
plication with his final account if the will fails to provide directions
for its full distribution."0 Furthermore, it is clear that an independent
executor, absent authority in the will, can never partition the testa-
tor's estate.6 ' This is so because the exercise of such power could sub-
stantially change a testator's will and thereby force the beneficiaries
to accept specific property rather than the undivided interests given
them by the will."'
4. Approving the final account filed with a proper application
for partition and distribution by the executor or by the distributees
to close the independent administration. This was the law prior to
the Probate Code of 1956,3 and it is probably still true today. 4
5. Compelling the independent executor to sell land in accordance
with directions in the will. Although this was judicially sanctioned
prior to the Code, this probably no longer exists because of a 1957
amendment to section 145 which provides that after the will has
been probated and the inventory, appraisement, and list of claims
has been filed and approved by the court, no further action of any
nature shall be had in the probate court as long as the estate is repre-
sented by an independent executor, except where the Code specifically
and explicitly provides for some action in the court.
6. Annulling provisions of the will. Although this was done prior
to the enactment of the Probate Code, 6 such practice would appear
to be of doubtful validity because of the 1957 amendment to sec-
tion 145.
3. Caveats Concerning Independent Executors
a. Classification of Creditors' Claims.-In view of the provision
that independent executors shall observe all provisions relevant to
the priority classification and pro rata payment of creditor's claims,"
it appears that a creditor has to make formal presentation of his
claim in authenticated form before the independent executor can
pay it. If the claim is rejected either expressly or by inaction of the
independent executor for thirty days after presentation and the
6
°Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 150 (1956).
61 Clark v. Posey, 329 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) error ref. n.r.e., noted, 14
Sw. L.J. 429 (1960).
"
2 McDonough v. Cross, 40 Tex. 251 (1874).
"
5 Shiner v. Shiner, 90 Tex. 414, 38 S.W. 1126 (1897).
" Tex. Prob. Code Ann. §§ 150, 152. See Woodward, Independent Administrations under
the Texas Probate Code, 34 Texas L. Rev. 687 (1956).
a' McCaffity v. Ramsey, 274 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error ref.
6ePrather v. McClelland, 76 Tex. 574, 13 S.W. 543 (1890).
67 Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 146. This provision, in effect, nullifies the former judicially
declared rule. See Smythe v. Caswell, 65 Tex. 379 (1886); Lessing v. Russek, 234 S.W.2d
891 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) error ref. n.r.e.
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creditor fails to bring suit within ninety days thereafter," the
creditor is subjected to the penalty of complete loss of the claim."9
Prior to the enactment of the 1956 Code, it was held that such a
penalty was not applicable to a claim that had been rejected by an
independent executor."0 Moreover, one outstanding authority has
stated that it "seems probable that the creditor does not have to
present an authenticated claim to an independent executor before
suing thereon."'" This opinion is based upon the statutory require-
ment of judicial approval of the claim and the useless formality of
such an action if the court has no jurisdiction to approve it.
b. Personal Liability for Negligent Losses.-The independent ex-
ecutor is personally liable for any losses resulting from failure to
use ordinary diligence in collecting all claims and debts due the
estate and in recovering possession of property belonging to the
estate." Solvent independent executors should view this possibility
with caution. Such an action would, like other suits against inde-
pendent executors, generally be brought in the district court and
subjected to the test of reasonableness by a jury or judge without
the protection afforded the executor acting under probate court
supervision.
c. Notice to Creditors.-The required one month or four month
notice to creditors should be published or given by the indepen-
dent executor"4 if he is to be secure from the penalty for damages
suffered by a creditor because of lack of notice." Those sections of
the Probate Code referring to such notices use the terms "personal
representative" and "representative," which in turn are defined by
section 3 (aa) of the Code to include an independent executor. Al-
though the 1957 amendment to section 3 (aa) provided that "the
inclusion of independent executors herein shall not be held to subject
such representatives to control of the courts in probate matters with
respect to settlement of estates except as provided by law," there is
"SFor an ordinary representative under court control, see Stamps v. Varelas, 313
S.W.2d 141 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958). But see Chandler v. Prichard, 321 S.W.2d 891 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1958) error ref. n.r.e., and the related case of Chandler v. Warlick, 321 S.W.2d
897 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) error ref. n.r.e., holding that the representative had a reason-
able time to investigate the claim before the ninety-day period begins to run.
"0See Anderson v. First Nat'l Bank, 120 Tex. 313, 38 S.W.2d 768 (1931); Woodward,
Some Developments in the Law of Independent Administrations, 37 Texas L. Rev. 828
(1959).
'0 Ditto v. Ditto, 293 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
7" Woodward, supra note 64, at 699.
"
2 Tex. Prob. Code Ann. 5 233 (1956).
7a Tex. Prob. Code Ann. 5 147 (1956), which also provides that the independent executor
does not have to plead to any suit for money until one year after the probate of the will
appointing him.
" Tex. Prob. Code Ann. §§ 294, 295 (1956); Woodward, supra note 64, at 698.
7'Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 297 (1956).
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nothing in such amendment which would exclude the requirement of
such notice by the independent executor."'
d. Oil and Gas Leases and Unitization Agreements.-Because of
the wording of section 367(b) which empowers executors acting
solely under court order to execute oil and gas leases extending be-
yond the termination of administration, it is uncertain whether the
independent executor has such a power. However, under general
principles, the section should serve as a source of such power for
him." The same problem exists with respect to pooling or unitiza-
tion under existing leases. 8 According to a recent decision, a probate
court has no power to authorize an independent executor to execute
an oil and gas lease." Logically, this would also be true regarding
pooling or unitization agreements.
e. Posting Bond Upon Proof of Mismanagement and Removal for
Disqualification.-Although the 1957 amendment to the Probate
Code -now seems to clarify the point that section 222, providing for
the removal by the probate court of "any personal representative"
for gross neglect or other stated reasons, does not apply to the inde-
pendent executor,80 there is still an area of question about the qualifi-
cations of the independent executor. For example, section 149 pro-
vides that the probate court may in the case of mismanagement of
the property by the independent executor or upon his betrayal of
trust require him to post bond. That same section also provides for
such action by the court if the independent executor "has in some
other way become disqualified." Does this mean that a court may
require an independent executor to post bond when there is a finding
that the executor is "unsuitable" under section 78 which lists the
grounds for disqualification of executors or administrators? This
point will be discussed hereafter.
f. Application to Independent Executors of Terms Such as "Execu-
tors" and "Representatives."-Prior to the 1957 amendment, section
146 provided that "the provisions of this Code shall not apply to
independent executors except where specifically made applicable
thereto.""1 As a result, serious problems of interpretation were raised
as to what extent the other provisions relating to "executors,"
Crepresentatives," or "personal representatives" were affected by
such a statement in those sections which were not specifically made
78Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 3 (aa) (Supp. 1962).
7 Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 367(b) (1956); Woodward, supra note 69, at 839.
78Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 369 (1956); Woodward, sufra note 64, at 690.
" Marshall v. E. R. Hobert Estate, 315 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) error ref.
"°Hocker v. Stevens, 42 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) error dism.; Woodward,
supra note 69, at 831-32, 839.
" Tex. Gen. & Spec. Laws 1955, ch. 55, § 146, at 136.
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applicable to independent executors. For example, section 77 estab-
lished the order of priority for applicants for letters testamentary
or of administration with the "executor" named in the will having
the highest priority. Because such provision was not made specifically
applicable to independent executors, it could have been literally con-
strued to mean that the section was inapplicable to an independent
executor and that the surviving spouse would prevail in a contest
for letters as against the independent executorRm---a ridiculous result.
As already mentioned, the 1957 amendment eliminated the second
sentence of section 146 and added a sentence to section 145 to the
effect that after probate and the filing of an inventory, as long as
the estate is represented by an independent executor, "further action
of any nature shall not be had in the court except where this Code
specifically and explicitly provides (therefore)." Thus, the term
"executor" as used in the code will probably apply to an independent
executor unless it would involve some action in the probate court."
Also, under the 1957 amendment, the inclusion of an independent
executor within the definition of "personal representative" or "repre-
sentative" will "not be held to subject such representative to control
of the courts in probate matters with respect to settlement of estates
except as provided by law." Thus, an independent executor may still
resign by action in the probate court under section 221 which pro-
vides such a procedure for "personal representatives."84 This would
be true because Roy v. Whitaker held that resignation is not a matter
"relating to the settlement of the estate." 85
g. Possibility of Disqualification as an "Unsuitable Person."-A
most important case involving the disqualification of an independent
executor to receive letters testamentary is the 1958 Texas Supreme
Court case of Boyles v. Gresham." In a prior case, it had been held
that even though a will made neither a devise nor a bequest, it was
entitled to probate because it appointed an independent executor."7
In the Gresham case, however, it was held that the independent
executor named in the will was not disqualified to receive letters as
an "unsuitable person" under section 78 merely because he asserted
a claim to all or part of the property of the estate as a devisee, heir,
trustee for other beneficiaries named in the will, or creditor of the
estate. A logical conclusion to be drawn from the latter case is that
" Woodward, supra note 64, at 693.
"3 Woodward, supra note 69, at 836.
14 ibid.
"92 Tex. 357, 49 S.W. 367 (1899), modifying 92 Tex. 346, 48 S.W. 892 (1898).
16 158 Tex. 158, 309 S.W.2d 50 (1958).
"
7 Boyles v. Gresham, 153 Tex. 106, 263 S.W.2d 935 (1954).
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if the interest of the personal representative is adverse to the estate
as an entity-to the extent that the applicant would be tempted to
fail in his duty to collect and preserve the assets owned or claimed
by the decedent-then that interest is enough to disqualify a repre-
sentative," including an independent executor. As a result, jurisdic-
tion of the probate court is invoked and bond is required; further-
more, if the representative neglects to post the bond, this sub-
jects the representative to removal." But if the applicant for letters
has no interest that would encourage him to neglect his fiduciary
duty, he is not disqualified if he asserts a claim as a devisee, heir,
trustee for other beneficiaries named in the will, or creditor of the
estate. There may also be a difference between an executor and an
administrator in this respect. Apparently, stronger indications of bad
faith are necessary to disqualify an "executor" than an "adminis-
trator."'
h. Powers of an Administrator Succeeding an Independent Execu-
tor.-Unless a specific appointment of a successor as independent
executor is made in a will, the successor does not have the powers of
an independent executor. To remedy this matter, at least in part,
the legislature in 1935 enacted what is now section 154 of the
Probate Code entitled "Powers of an Administrator Who Succeeds
an Independent Executor." However, this section merely permits
the administrator to exercise under court order the powers conferred
upon the independent executor; 9' therefore, this practice does not
constitute a nonjudicial administration.
B. Qualified Community Administrators
Independent executorships are available only upon the use of
certain special words or their equivalent in a will. Intestate situa-
tions, however, also present opportunities for out-of-court adminis-
tration, particularly with respect to the powers of a surviving spouse
over community property. If an interest in community property
passes by intestacy to someone other than the surviving spouse, such
survivor may upon qualification administer all of the community
property for at least one year. However, in order to qualify, the
administrator must post a bond in response to a court order. Pur-
suant to qualification, the surviving spouse may administer the entire
community estate free of court control under very broad powers
" Woodward, supra note 69, at 844.
" Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 149 (1956).
" Woodward, supra note 69, at 844.
'Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 154 (1956).
1963 ]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
until the distributees force termination." Parenthetically, the original
bill that established the present Probate Code would have permitted
the survivor to qualify as community administrator when an interest
in community property passes to a third party by will. However, this
provision was eliminated by a House amendment."'
Qualified community administration had a number of disad-
vantages prior to the enactment of the Texas Probate Code, viz.,
1. If a qualified survivor sold the original community assets and
reinvested the proceeds, he and his bondsmen became insurers and
thus liable without fault."
2. The powers of such administrators were extended to allowing
mortgages of the entire community to secure the administrator's
personal debt" and to preferring one creditor over another.
3. In many instances, there was no provision for closing such a
qualified administration and obtaining a discharge.'
4. This form of community administration was apparently ap-
plicable only when the decedent's spouse left a child.
5. The bond was required to be in the amount of the value of the
entire community property.
However, a number of new changes have been made under the
new Code making community administration more advantageous;
thus:
1. The qualified survivor and his bondsman are liable for estate
losses only where the survivor is guilty of gross negligence or bad
faith.'
2. The administrator may not mortgage community property to
secure a personal debt or appropriate community property for his
101
own use.
3. The qualified administration may be terminated after one year
from the filing of the administrator's bond at the instance of the
9 Tex. Prob. Code Ann. §§ 161-167 (1956).
93 See Tex. Gen. & Spec. Laws 1955, ch. 55.94 Beaton v. McFarland, 134 Tex. 652, 134 S.W.2d 1058 (1940); Fidelity Union Ins.
Co. v. Hutchins, 134 Tex. 268, 133 S.W.2d 105 (1939); Huie, Changes Made by the
Texas Probate Code in the Administration of Community Property, 34 Texas L. Rev. 700,
716 (1956).
95 Huie, supra note 94, at 714, and cases cited therein beginnnig with Jordan v. Inthurn,
51 Tex. 276 (1879).
"Leatherwood v. Arnold, 66 Tex. 414, 1 S.W. 173 (1886); Huie, supra note 94, at
718.9 7Huie, supra note 94, at 718.
" Morris v. Williams, 92 S.W.2d 541 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) error ref.; Tex. Rev. Civ.
Stat. Ann. art. 3664 (1925).
"Tex. Rev. Civ. Star. Ann. art. 3667 (1925).
'°Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 168 (1956).
... Tex. Prob. Code Ann. S 167 (1956).
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qualified survivor or by an owner of the decedent's share, either in
the district court or by proceedings as in other independent ad-
ministrations.
10 2
4. The corporate surety bond of the administrator has been re-
duced to one-half the gross value of the community estate."'
5. The remarriage of a wife acting as a qualified administrator
does not terminate her powers; this is also true as to a wife acting
as an unqualified administrator.'"
6. The administration is now applicable "whenever an interest in
community property passes by intestacy to someone other than the
surviving spouse......
Several things should be noted about a qualified administration:
(1) the requirement of a full accounting to the court upon appli-
cation of any creditor who has not been paid in full one year after
the filing of the required inventory by the administrator,' (2) the
requirement of payment of community debts within the time and
in the order prescribed in other administrations with pro rata pay-
ment of all claims of the same class in cases of a deficiency of assets
to pay all in full, and (3) the unavailability of such an administra-
tion if the decedent's community interest passes by will."'
C. Unqualified Community Survivors
Even if the community survivor does not qualify as community
administrator, the surviving spouse retains extensive powers over
the community property. Until a personal representative of the dece-
dent has qualified, the surviving spouse may sue and be sued, mort-
gage, lease, dispose of property for the purpose of paying community
debts, collect claims, discharge community obligations, and wind up
community affairs.0 ' The unqualified survivor is really a fiduciary
having essentially the same powers and duties as a personal representa-
tive. Neither a bond nor a formal account is required. But, the un-
qualified survivor is responsible for keeping a full account of all
community debts and expenses paid and the disposition of com-
munity property."' One disadvantage of this method is that the
survivor's rights terminate upon payment of the community debts.
Moreover, the necessity of debts may constitute an obstacle to the
°1'Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 175 (1956).
10' Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 165 (1956).
'
0 4 Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 176 (1956).
101 Tex. Prob. Code Ann. 5 161 (1956).
1
06Tex. Prob. Code Ann. 55 164-171 (1956).107Tex. Prob. Code Ann. 5 161 (1956).
'08 Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 160 (1956).
20'Basye, supra note 1, at 185.
1963 ]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
purchase of assets from the survivor. Therefore, the purchaser must
satisfy himself that there are in fact community debts existing; " ' the
size of the debts is immaterial. On the other hand, the powers of a
qualified community administrator do not depend upon the existence
of any community debts; in fact, sales by a qualified community
administrator have been upheld although they occurred thirty-two
years after his qualification. "1'
The 1956 Code did not change other extensive powers of the
unqualified community survivor, some of which are greater than
those of an ordinary personal representative."' For example, the sur-
vivor may sell community property to pay a community debt even
though the debt has been barred by limitations."' Furthermore, the
survivor can raise money to pay community debts by a mortgage,"4
by an oil and gas lease,"' and by an outright sale. Moreover, he can
even sell the community homestead to pay community debts" al-
though the creditors would not otherwise be able to reach it."'
V. DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS BETWEEN SURVIVING SPOUSE
AND DECEDENT'S REPRESENTATIVE
There are a number of possible variations in regard to the alloca-
tion of powers between a surviving spouse and the personal repre-
sentative of the decedent spouse. The principle established in the case
of Moody v. Smoot" is particularly important since that principle
was accepted in the 1956 Probate Code."9 The Smoot decision was
that the husband, as unqualified community survivor, was entitled
to be the administrator of the community estate in preference to the
decedent wife's administrator, but that the wife, as surviving spouse,
does not have preference over the husband's personal representative
in administering the community estate." °
11°Grebe v. First State Bank, 136 Tex. 226, 150 S.W.2d 64 (1941).
..' Drought v. Story, 143 S.W. 361 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) error ref. See Huie, suftra
note 94, at 712.
1' Huie, supra note 94, at 702.
."'Stone v. Jackson, 109 Tex. 385, 210 S.W. 953 (1919).
1'Echols v. Jacobs Mercantile Co., 84 S.W. 1082 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905) error ref.
"' Griffin v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 133 Tex. 45, 125 S.W.2d 545 (1939).
"' Davis v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 134 Tex. 201, 134 S.W.2d 1042 (1940).
117 See Brewer, Relative Rights of Heirs and Unsecured Creditors to a Decedent's Home-
stead in Texas, 13 Texas L. Rev. 423 (1935).
1"78 Tex. 119, 14 S.W. 285 (1890).
". Tex. Prob. Code Ann. S 177 (1956), has not differentiated between husband and
wife in expressly providing that "Until such partition is applied for and made, the executor
or administrator of the deceased shall recover possession of all such common property and
hold the same in trust for the benefit of the creditors and others entitled thereto." Compare
Huie, supra note 94, at 703-705, with Haddaway, Community Property in Administration
of Estates, 33 Texas L. Rev. 1012, 1017-33 (1955).
ao Moody v. Smoot, 78 Tea, 119, 14 SW. 285 (1890).
[Vol. 17
1963] NON-JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
A. Wife's "Special Community"'121
The term "special community" is herein used to refer to all items
of community property which are under the management and con-
trol of the wife. It is clear that the wife has the management and
control not only of her separate property, but also the revenues
therefrom even though such revenues are community property."'
However, it is possible that the wife does not have the right to con-
trol her personal earnings."' Furthermore, the statutes dealing with
the rights of married women were amended in 1957 without adding
any provisions expressly giving the wife any rights of management
and control over her personal earnings."4 However, in line with the
reasoning of an outstanding authority in this field,"' the United
States Court for the Northern District of Texas held that the wife,
not the husband, has control over her personal earnings."6
121 Editor's comment. Subsequent to the date of this speech and immediately prior to
the publication, H.B. No. 403 was passed by the Texas Legislature and approved on June
10, 1963. The act, effective 90 days after May 24, 1963, is designed to remove the dis-
abilities of coverture of a married woman in connection with her contracts and her man-
agement and control of her separate property. The act expressly amends Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
arts. 4614, 4618, 4621, 4624, and 4626. Article 4623 was repealed. The amended art. 4626,
Tex. Gen. & Spec. Laws 1963, ch. 472, § 4626, at 1189, now provides:
A married woman shall have the same powers and capacity as if she were a
feme sole, in her own name, to contract and be contracted with, sue and be
sued, and all her separate property, her personal earnings and the revenues
from her separate estate which is not exempt from execution under the laws
of Texas shall thereafter be subject to her debts and be liable therefor, and
her contracts and obligations shall be binding on her.
Any consideration of the wife's special community should definitely take into account H.B.
No. 403.
12Bearden v. Knight, 149 Tex. 108, 228 S.W.2d 837 (1950). In this case, the court
attached no significance to the statutory omission in 1925 of the express statutory provisions
giving the wife power to manage the rent from her real estate.
12 Pottorff v. J. D. Adams & Co., 70 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) error ref. At
least one writer has suggested that the statutory omission may have been inadvertent. Huie,
supra note 94. It is to be noted that the Pottorff case was not overruled, but tacitly ap-
proved by the Texas Supreme Court in Strickland v. Wester, 131 Tex. 23, 112 S.W.2d
1047 (1938).
The court there held that decedent husband's creditor could reach the personal
earnings of the wife when such earnings had been invested in land. The holding may have
been unnecessarily broad. Apparently, two days before a forced sale was ordered to satisfy
a judgment against the husband, he tried to put his land beyond his creditor by selling it
to his wife who bought it with her personal earnings. In The Community Property Law of
Texas, Commentary, 13 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. 44 (1960), Huie has said the Strickland
holding is "inconsistent with the purposes of the 1913 plan and should be overruled."
Huie also points out that the 1925 compilers saw no need for a special provision for the
wife's management- of income from her separate property since such items had been made
expressly her separate property over which she had been given power of management, this
being prior to the decision in Arnold v. Leonard, 114 Tex. 535, 273 S.W. 799 (1925), de-
claring the attempt to change the community property nature of such items unconstitutional.
12 See Tyler, Federal Taxation and Community Property: the Wife's Rights in Her
Earnings, 16 Sw. L.J. 643, 655 (1962). At that page, note the reference to the conflict
among the writers as to whether the Pottorff case is right or wrong.
... See Huie, supra note 94.
seHelm v. Campbell, Civil No. 9043, N.D. Tex., ., 1962, not yet
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In summary, the wife's personal earnings may or may not be a
part of the "special community," but all revenue from her separate
property may be considered as such, and probably all reinvestments
of such revenue will be treated similarly. The importance of this
determination is that the reasoning of Moody v. Smoot has been
extended by the Probate Code to the special community so that
the wife as "surviving spouse ... is entitled to retain possession and
control of all community property which was legally under the
management of the surviving spouse during the continuance of
the marriage ... ""'
B. Various Situations Calling For Distribution Of Powers
In determining the distribution of powers over the community
property between the decedent's personal representative and the
decedent's surviving spouse, several situations should be considered
in connection with section 177 of the Texas Probate Code: 12 8
1. When the Husband Dies First and Names an Executor Other Than
His Wife.-Under the Moody v. Smoot principle, the husband's
executor is entitled to administer the entire general community."'
The surviving wife is entitled to retain possession and control of her
special community free of control by the husband's executor. Of
course, as previously mentioned, the wife cannot qualify as general
community administrator if the husband's community interest passes
by will, nor can she administer any of the community as unqualified
survivor if either an executor or administrator of the husband's estate
qualifies.
2. When an Intestate Husband Dies First.-If the husband dies
intestate, the surviving wife is entitled to qualify as community ad-
ministrator over both the general and special community, even as
against the administrator of the husband's estate. However, the
surviving wife waives this right as to the general community if
reported. It would appear, however, that investments made with revenue from the wife's
separate property are exempt from the husband's debts and thus apparently under the man-
agement and control of the wife. Hawkins v. Britten State Bank, 122 Tex. 69, 52 S.W.2d
243 (1932) (equipment purchased with income from the wife's separate farm), citing
Emerson-Brantingham Implement Co. v. Brothers, 194 S.W. 608 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917)
(automobile purchased by wife with her personal earnings) (decided prior to the 1925
statutory omission when the wife had express power to manage her personal earnings);
Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Wilson, 279 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error ref. n.r.e.
(US Savings Bonds purchased with income from the wife's separate property). See Note, 34
Texas L. Rev. 477 (1956).
'"
7Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 177 (1956).
12
8 See generally Haddaway, supra note 119, at 1015-1026.
125 General community property is defined as all communitty property other than the




she knowingly allows a third party actually to qualify as permanent
administrator and take possession of such community. If the surviv-
ing wife has not qualified as community administrator, the husband's
administrator is entitled to administer the general community, but
the wife can retain possession and control of her special community.
3. When the Wife Dies First Testate and Names an Executor Other
Than the Husband.-The wife's executor is entitled to administer
her "special community" as well as her separate property, but the
surviving husband is entitled to continued possession and control
of all of the general community, including the wife's one-half."'
4. When the Intestate Wife Dies First.-If the wife dies intestate,
the surviving husband is entitled to administer the entire community
estate either as qualified community administrator or as unqualified
survivor. However, if the wife had accumulated revenues from her
separate property during the marriage, the surviving husband waives
the right as to the wife's special community if he knowingly con-
sents to a third party qualifying as permanent administrator and
taking possession of such special community. If the surviving hus-
band has not qualified as community administrator, the wife's ad-
ministrator is entitled to administer the special community, but the
husband is entitled to retain possession and control of the general
community. As previously stated, the husband cannot qualify as
community administrator if the wife's community interest passes
by will.
VI. SHORTENING AND CLOSING ADMINISTRATION
Texas has also provided a number of methods, both judicial and
nonjudicial, for shortening and closing an administration.
A. Summary Closing If The Estate Is Insufficient To Pay Family
Allowance And General Claims
If at any time after the filing of an inventory, appraisement, and
list of claims, it is established that the estate, even though a very
large one, is insufficient to pay the family allowance and the claims
of general creditors, the court administration may be summarily
closed."' Upon order of the court, the representative may pay the
claims to the extent permitted by the estate assets in the order of
priority provided by section 322; i.e., funeral and last illness expenses,
administration expenses, secured claims so far as they can be paid
... Tex. Prob. Code Ann. 5 177(b) (1956).
... Basye, supra note 1, at 179.
..
2 Tex. Prob. Code Ann. 5 143 (1956).
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out of the proceeds subject to the security, all claims presented within
one year of the original grant of letters; and thereafter account to
the court. Thereupon, the court, with or without notice, may allow,
adjust, or disallow such account. If the account is allowed, the court
will decree final distribution, discharge the representative, and close
the administration.
B. Withdrawing Estates From Administration By Posting Bond:
Partition And Distribution
After the return of an inventory and appraisement, any dis-
tributee may upon filing a written complaint cause the executor or
administrator to render under oath an exhibit of the condition of
the estate. Thereafter, any one or more of the distributees may
execute and deliver a bond in double the gross appraised value of the
estate; thereupon, the court shall order the representative to deliver
the estate forthwith to the distributees, discharge the representative,
and declare the administration closed.13 Creditors may bring an
action on the bond or alternatively an action against any or all of
the distributees, who shall be liable for their just proportion of
the distributed estate against which a lien shall exist to secure the
payment of the bond and the claims and debts secured thereby.""
In connection with this proceeding, any distributee may, by
written application to the court, obtain an order of partition and
distribution.135 Such an order can also be required without any
special bond by the distributee or by the representative twelve months
after the original grant of letters upon written application there-
for.' 6
C. Partition Of Survivor's Share Of Community Property Or
Joint Owner's Share Upon Posting Bond
Subsequent to the grant of letters and the return of an inventory,
appraisement, and list of claims, an application for community
property partition may be filed and effectuated by a surviving spouse
on posting bond in an amount equal to the survivor's interest in the
estate against which creditors may obtain judgment." ' Under section
386, any time after grant of letters, the joint owners of property
with the decedent may require partition between the applicant and
the decedent's estate.'
133 Tex. Prob. Code Ann. 5 262-265 (1956).
134 Tex. Prob. Code Ann. 266, 268-69 (1956).
...Tex. Prob. Code Ann. 5 267 (1956).
'Tex. Prob. Code Ann. 5 373 (1956).
.. Tex. Prob. Code Ann. 5 385 (1956).
... Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 386 (1956).
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D. Termination Of Independent Administration
After One Year Upon Proper Showing
Pursuant to section 152, any distributee may make application to
terminate an independent administration and the authority of the
independent executor to act as such if he can show no further
necessity for such administration.' Furthermore, the presumption
exists that an independent administration of an estate is closed after
one year.' However, as stated in a recent Texas Supreme Court case,
the administration of the estate should not be in effect ordered
closed if it is clearly indicated that the estate has not been fully
administered."'
E. Termination Of Qualified Community Administration
After One Year
A qualified community administration may be terminated after
one year from the filing of bond at the instance of the qualified
survivor or the owners of the decedent's share by an action in either
an appropriate district court or by a proceeding similar to those
used in other independent administrations."
F. Grounds Of Removal To Terminate Authority Of
Representatives To Act
As previously mentioned, an independent executor cannot be re-
moved unless he fails to give bond upon a showing of mismanage-
ment, betrayal of trust, or other disqualification." An administrator
under court supervision is treated differently. The probate court
may remove, without notice, a representative under its control for
the following reasons: (1) failure to qualify in the manner and
time required by law, (2) failure to return an inventory and list
of claims within sixty days of qualification, (3) failure to give a
new bond in the time required by law, (4) absence from the state
without the court's permission or removal from the state, and (5)
inability to be served because of unknown whereabouts or eluding
service. There are numerous circumstances in which the administra-
tor can be removed upon notice, including failure to settle the
estate within three years after the grant of letters unless extended
by the court on a showing of sufficient cause supported by oath.'"
.. Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 152 (1956).
'40 Jones v. Jimmerson, 302 S.W.2d 161 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) error ref. n.r.e.
'.' Davis v. East Texas Say. & Loan Ass'n, - Tex. -, 354 S.W.2d 926 (1962).
'"Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 175 (1956).
'"Tex. Prob. Code Ann. 149 (1956). See note 57 supra.
'" Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 222 (1956).
1963 ]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
G. Replacement Of Independent Executor By Receiver
Although there have been intimations in the cases that the district
court, in the exercise of its inherent equity powers, may remove the
independent executor for mismanagement or other breaches of
fiduciary duties,14 the matter does not appear to be particularly
important. This is so because a district court may, in effect, replace
an independent executor with a receiver as an incident to a suit for
an accounting.14" Although the independent executor is not actually
removed, the receiver takes over possession and management of the
estate.
147
VII. PROTECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES IN CLOSING
OUT-OF-COURT ADMINISTRATIONS
A. Pre-Probate Code Era
Under the old law, the probate court had no jurisdiction to close
an independent administration. The estate was, in fact, closed and
the authority of the independent executor terminated by his distri-
bution to the distributees, but this could not be made to appear of
record. Thus, it was often difficult for a purchaser, a stock transfer
agent, or a plaintiff in an action against an estate to dispense with
the joinder of the executor, even though the administration might
have been terminated.4 ' Moreover, some county judges took the
position that although they had no jurisdiction to receive a final
account and discharge the independent executor, it was necessary
for the executor to continue paying bond premiums indefinitely."'
B. Under Texas Probate Code
Under the 1956 Texas Probate Code, a change has been effectuated.
An independent executor may now terminate an independent ad-
ministration and end his authority by filing a final account verified
by affidavit with the probate clerk."' Thereafter, third parties may
deal directly with the distributees, and the latters' action shall be
valid and binding, notwithstanding any false statement in the final
account."' Thus, after such filing, it is unnecessary to require the
joinder of the independent executor in any conveyance of estate
143 Woodward, supra note 69, at 839-41.
14 O'Connor v. O'Connor, 320 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) error dism., relying
trimarily on Griggs v. Brewster, 122 Tex. 588, 62 S.W.2d 980 (1933).
147 In O'Connor, supra note 146, the district court had removed the independent execu-
tor, but the appellate court had treated such order as surplusage while sustaining the ap-
pointment of a receiver.
... Woodward, supra note 64, at 694-95.
14' Ibid.
"' Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 151(a) (1956).
."Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 151(b) (1956).
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properties. But it is to be noted that the independent executor is not
relieved "from liability for any mismanagement of the estate or for
liability for any false statement made in the affidavit.' ' . Therefore,
a purchaser buying property from the distributees in reliance on
a statement in the affidavit that all debts have been paid would be
protected from the claims of any unpaid creditors, but the inde-
pendent executor would be personally liable to such creditors for
any false statements or any mismanagement of the estate.'
As already mentioned, any distributee may, by action in the pro-
bate court after notice and hearing, obtain an order closing the
administration and terminating the independent executor's powers
to act at any time after the estate has been fully administered."4
There is no provision in the Code, however, for an independent
executor to secure discharge on his own motion. But other procedures
may be available, viz.,
1. Upon action initiated by a distributee to close the independent
administration, the court could probably approve the executor's
final account and discharge him."'
2. The past practice has been for the independent executor to
rely on receipts or releases from distributees when all are of age and
competent and no trouble is anticipated."' This practice is probably
still available since there is nothing in the Code to the contrary.
3. If the will fails either to distribute the entire estate or to
provide a means of partition, the independent executor may file
a final account in the probate court; the court may then partition
and distribute the estate. 7 and can probably also discharge the in-
dependent executor."' However, if the will distributes the entire
estate and also provides a means of partition, the probate court has
no jurisdiction to examine the account of the independent executor
and grant a discharge.
4. It is also probable that the district court may, in the exercise
of its general equitable powers, receive the independent executor's
final account and discharge him."'
1"' Ibid.
1-3 Woodward, supra note 64, at 696. Section 151 is probably applicable to estates pending
before January 1, 1956, since section 2 makes the Code procedure applicable to pending
cases except where the court is of the opinion that its application in particular proceedings
would not be feasible or would work an injustice. Section 26 prevents the impairment of
any existing right. Neither of such sections would prevent a closing by affidavit.
"
4 Tex. Prob. Code Ann. S 152 (1956).
ass Woodward, supra note 64, at 697.
a5 Ibid.
"'Tex. Prob. Code Ann. 5 150 (1956).
"' Woodward, supra note 64, at 697.
"' This possibility is strengthened by Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Uniform Declaratory
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5. The resignation procedure is available for the independent
executor. It is settled that the old statutes concerning resignation
included the independent executor. " ° Furthermore, under principles
previously discussed, the present definition of "personal representa-
tive" in the resignation provisions of the Code includes an indepen-
dent executor.1"' Although the administration would not be termi-
nated in a technical sense, the final account would show all debts
paid, proper distribution of remaining assets, and no necessity for
further administration.' The court can enter an order accepting the
independent executor's resignation, approving his final account, and
discharging his bondsmen and him. 6 ' Such an order is a final judg-
ment which is not subject to collateral attack."'
VIII. CONCLUSION
Among American jurisdictions, Texas has led the way in stream-
lining the administration of decedents' estates and in dispensing with
formal court administration. Texas methods could well be used to
advantage by other jurisdictions in the United States. However, in
order to provide a complete system of expeditious procedures for
estate administration, Texas should revise its methods for non-
testamentary, non-community property situations. The English sys-
tem furnishes an example by which the administrator or executor,
now under probate court control in Texas, might operate entirely
free of court supervision after grant of letters of administration.
Upon the application of an interested party, the court might assert
control. This procedure would focus the probate court's concentra-
tion on the situation in which it can furnish its greatest assistance,
namely, the contested situation. Although the Texas community
property system often complicates estate administration by creating
dual representatives, formal judicial administration requirements
create additional complications and unnecessary expense. Creditors
and distributees have many means of protection; their interests are
not irreparably imperiled by such out-of-court arrangements be-
cause formal court administration or proper bonding arrangements
are available under certain circumstances.
Judgments Act) art. 2524-1, 55 1, 4 (1951). See Pressler v. Wilke, 84 Tex. 344, 19 S.W.
436 (1892).
160Roy v. Whitaker, 92 Tex. 357, 46 S.W. 367 (1899), modifying 92 Tex. 346, 48
S.W. 892 (1898); Woodward, supra note 64, at 698.
161Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 221 (1956).
162 Woodward, supra note 64, at 698.
l..Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 221(f) (1956).
164 Simkins, Administration of Estates in Texas § 283 (3d ed. 1934).
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Regarding the out-of-court executor's or administrator's release
from future liability, there is need for an express provision that will
permit an independent executor to seek a discharge from his fiduci-
ary position. However, in view of the numerous methods available
upon the closing of the estate, satisfactory protection from liability
generally exists.
